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CORRECTING DEADLY CONFUSION:
RESPONDING TO JURY INQUIRIES
IN CAPITAL CASES
Stephen P. Garveyt
Sheri Lynn Johnsontt
& Paul MarcusT
INTRODUCTION
When members of a capital jury ask the trial judge to clarify a
sentencing instruction, chances are good they didn't understand the
instruction. Why else would they have asked the question? Moreover,
the trial judge might think it best to clarify matters.
However, the judge presiding over Lonnie Weeks's capital mur-
der trial thought differently. The jurors there asked whether they
were required to sentence Weeks to death if they believed his crime was
heinous, or if they believed Weeks himself constituted a continuing
threat to society. The answer, as a matter of law, is no.' But rather
than answering the question, or otherwise making sure the jurors un-
derstood the point, the trial judge simply told them to go back and
reread the instruction-the very same instruction that prompted their
question in the first place. The jury sentenced Weeks to death.
Weeks appealed. He worked his way through the Virginia courts
on direct appeal,2 and then through the federal courts in habeas
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corpus proceedings.3 He lost at every step, including his last one in
the U.S. Supreme Court.4
How could Weeks have lost? When the members of a capital sen-
tencing jury say that they don't understand a critical instruction,
shouldn't the judge be required to answer them with something more
than a directive to go back and read the same instruction one more
time? The courts have thought not. The Supreme Court, for exam-
ple, concluded that the jury probably did understand the law, despite
its question. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
five-member majority, Weeks "ha[d] demonstrated only that there ex-
ist[ed] a slight possibility that the jury considered itself precluded
from considering mitigating evidence."5
Here, we put this conclusion to the test. We use the results of a
mock jury study to examine how well jurors who are given the sentenc-
ing instructions actually used in Weeks understand the relevant consti-
tutional principles. We also examine what, if any, difference it would
have made if the judge had given a clarifying instruction, instead of
simply telling the jurors to go back and re-read the original instruc-
tion.6 Part I describes the facts of Weeks in more detail. Part II
presents the results of our study. Part HI uses these results to explain
how trial courts-the Supreme Court's decision in Weeks notwithstand-
ing-should respond when faced with a capital jury's request for clari-
fication of a critical sentencing instruction.
I
WEEKs v ANAEL OEw
A Virginia jury convicted Lonnie Weeks of "capital murder."7
Weeks had been the passenger in a stolen car when State TrooperJose
Cavazos pulled the car over for speeding. Cavazos ordered Weeks out
of the car. As Weeks exited, he shot Cavazos six times, killing him.
According to Weeks, the shooting was on impulse. But the jury didn't
3 See Weeks v. Angelone, 4 F. Supp.2d 497 (E.D. Va. 1998), dismissed, 176 F.3d 249
(4th Cir. 1999), affd, 120 S. Ct. 727 (2000).
4 See Weeks v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 727 (2000).
5 Id. at 734 (emphasis omitted).
6 For a discussion of the methodological limitations of such studies, see, for example,
Mark Costanzo & Sally Costanzo, Jury Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Phase: Legal As-
sumptions, Empirical Findings, and a Research Agenda, 16 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 185, 190-92
(1992) (reviewing advantages and disadvantages of simulation studies), andJoel D. Lieber-
man & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 3
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 589, 591-96 (1997) (discussing methodological limitations of
research on jury instruction process).
7 "Capital murder" under Virginia law includes the "willful, deliberate, and premedi-
tated killing of a law-enforcement officer." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(6) (Michie Supp.
1999).
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believe him. The real issue at trial was punishment: Should Weeks be
sentenced to life imprisonment or death?
Weeks presented a wide range of evidence in mitigation: Weeks
was twenty-years old when he shot Trooper Cavazos. He'd grown up
in a poor and violent neighborhood in Fayetteville, North Carolina.
His father died when he was ten; his mother, an addict, was unable to
care for or discipline him. Weeks nonetheless stayed out of trouble,
thanks largely to the support of a strong and loving grandmother, to
the time and energy he devoted to high-school basketball, and to his
church, which he attended regularly.8 But when Weeks graduated
from high school, his girlfriend told him she was pregnant, and all
that changed. As Weeks testified, "I was involved with a young lady...
and she was pregnant... and I didn't want to leave her.... ."9 Weeks
turned down the college athletic scholarships he had received, moved
in with his girlfriend, and stopped going to church. In time, he began
selling marijuana with other young men from his neighborhood. He
was eventually arrested for selling drugs, pleaded guilty, and received
a three-year suspended sentence with five years probation. 10 The
events leading to the murder of Trooper Cavazos followed.
When the presentation of evidence at the penalty phase of the
trial was over, the judge read the jury four separate instructions."
One of these-Instruction No. 2-would later assume center stage in
the case. It read in full:
You have convicted the defendant of an offense which may be
punished by death. You must decide whether the defendant shall
be sentenced to death or to imprisonment for life and a fine of a
specific amount, but not more than $100,000. Before the penalty
can be fixed at death, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt at least one of the following two alternatives:
1. That, after consideration of his history and background,
there is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to
society; or
2. That his conduct in committing the offense was outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it in-
volved depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim
beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish the act of
murder.
8 This rendition of the facts is taken from testimony presented at the penalty phase
of the trial. See Penalty Phase Trial Record at 62-175, Commonwealth v. Weeks, Grim. No.
33170 (Prince William County Cir. Ct. Oct. 21, 1993) [hereinafter Trial Record-Oct. 21]
(on file with authors).
9 Id. at 67 (testimony of Lonnie Weeks).
10 See id. at 72 (testimony of Lonnie Weeks).
11 For the full set of instructions, see infra Appendix IV.
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If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has
proved beyond a reasonable doubt either of the two alternatives,
and as to that alternative you are unanimous, then you may fix the
punishment at death or if you believe from all the evidence that the
death penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of
the defendant at life imprisonment or imprisonment for live [sic]
and a fine of a specific amount, but not more than $100,000.00.
If the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt at least one of the alternatives, then you shall fix the punish-
ment of the defendant at life imprisonment or imprisonment for
live [sic] and a fine of a specific amount, but not more than
$100,000.00.12
Weeks claimed on appeal that the jury, due to an erroneous un-
derstanding of Instruction No. 2, had disregarded the evidence he
had presented in mitigation.
Instruction No. 2 is no stranger to the Supreme Court. The in-
struction is part of the pattern set of instructions given in most, if not
all, Virginia death-penalty trials. Indeed, the Supreme Court upheld
this very instruction against a facial challenge two years ago. In
Buchanan v. Angelone,i3 the petitioner argued that Instruction No. 2
was unconstitutional because it contained no language explaining the
meaning of mitigation, nor did it explain the circumstances under
which a capital jury could determine that death was not warranted.
Instruction No. 2, the petitioner in Buchanan complained, was thus a
poor vehicle for impressing upon the jury the role and meaning of
mitigation in the context of a capital-trial penalty phase. The Court
disagreed, holding that Instruction No. 2 "did not foreclose the jury's
consideration of any mitigating evidence."14
But the jury in Weeks, unlike the jury in Buchanan, expressly asked
the judge for clarification, sending the judge the following question
during its deliberations:
If we believe that Lonnie Weeks, Jr., is guilty of at least one of
the alternatives, then is it our duty as ajury to issue the death pen-
alty? Or, must we decide (even though he is guilty of one of the
alternatives) whether or not to issue the death penalty or one of the
life sentences? What is the [R]ule? Please clarify.15
Instruction No. 2 should already have provided the answer to this
question, but apparently it hadn't.
12 Weeks v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 727, 730 n.1 (2000).
13 522 U.S. 269 (1998).
14 Id at 277.
15 Penalty Phase Trial Record at 63-64, Commonwealth v. Weeks, Crim. No. 33170
(Prince William County Cir. Ct. Oct. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Trial Record-Oct. 22] (on
file with authors).
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Faced with the jury's question, the defense asked the court to "in-
struct the jury that even if they find one or both of the mitigating
factors-I'm sorry, the factors that have been proved beyond a reason-
able doubt, that they may still impose a life sentence, or a life sentence
plus a fine."1 6 The judge rejected the defense request and responded
instead with the following notation at the bottom of the jury's inquiry:
See second paragraph of Instruction #2 (Beginning with "If you
find from .. .etc."). 17
In other words, the judge simply told the jury to go back and read the
instruction, which the judge had already read to them once and which
the jurors had had in their possession (together with the three other
instructions) while they had been deliberating.
A couple of hours later, the jury sentenced Weeks to death, find-
ing that his "conduct in committing the offense [was] outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved depravity or
mind and/or aggravated battery .... ,,18 The court reporter noted
that "a majority of the jury members [were] in tears" 19 as they deliv-
ered their verdict.
Weeks claimed on appeal that the jurors who sentenced him to
death didn't fully understand that they could and should consider all
the mitigating evidence he presented, and that the judge's actual re-
ply to their question did little, if anything, to dispel that confusion. At
least some of the jurors, Weeks argued, thought the law required them
to sentence him to death if they believed his crime was heinous, or if
they believed Weeks himself constituted a continuing threat to society,
no matter what mitigating evidence he presented. Under these cir-
cumstances, he submitted, the trial court was obliged to clarify the
instruction.
The Supreme Court disagreed. Relying on its earlier decision in
Buchanan, the Court assumed that the instructions in Weeks, including
Instruction No. 2, were constitutionally sufficient.20 Indeed, the
Court emphasized that Weeks was actually better off than Buchanan
insofar as the Weeks jurors, but not the Buchanan jurors, had been
16 Id. at 65.
17 Juror's Second Question to Judge (Oct. 22, 1993) (on file with authors).
18 Trial Record-Oct. 22, supra note 15, at 66-67. The full verdict form read:
[W] e the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant Lonnie
Weeks, Jr., guilty of capital murder, and having unanimously found that his
conduct in committing the offense [was) outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhumane, in that it involved depravity of mind and[/] or aggra-
vated battery, and having considered the evidence in mitigation of the of-
fense, unanimously fix his punishment at death ....
Id.
19 Trial Record-Oct. 22, supra note 15, at 67.
20 Weeks v. Angelone, 120 S. C. 727, 732 (2000).
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given a separate and specific instruction-Instruction No. 4-on the
meaning of mitigation.21
Still, as the dissenters in Weeks pointed out, ajuror certainly could
have misconstrued Instruction No. 2, even if she had also been given
Instruction No. 4.22 Instruction No. 2 starts out by defining the two
possible aggravating factors and explaining the state's burden of
proof.23 It next says that if the jury members unanimously find that
the Commonwealth has met its burden, "then you may fix the punish-
ment at death or if you believe from all the evidence that the death
penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the defen-
dant at life imprisonment .... "24 Like the Weeks dissenters, we too
suspect that this clause contains the confusion that prompted the
jury's question.
Under what circumstances should a juror conclude that the
death penalty is "notjustified"? As the Weeks dissenters explained, the
answer is unclear because the instruction is ambiguous.25 According
to one interpretation, ajuror might think that she is initially supposed
to decide if the state has proven the existence of one of the two aggra-
vating circumstances and only then decide whether the death penalty is
or is not justified based on all the evidence, including the evidence in
mitigation. Alternatively, a juror might think she is supposed to con-
sider all the evidence, including the evidence in mitigation, but only
insofar as it relates to the state's success or failure in proving the exis-
tence of one of the aggravating circumstances, with death being re-
quired if the state has successfully carried its burden. The first
reading is constitutional; the second is not.
In short, a juror certainly could have read the instruction in the
way Weeks suggested. But that still leaves the real question: Would a
reasonable juror have misinterpreted the instruction in this way, espe-
cially where, as in Weeks, the jury asked for clarification and the judge
said in reply to go back and reread the original instruction? The
21 See id&
22 See id. at 735 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23 See infra Appendix IV.
24 Id.
25 See Weeks, 120 S. Ct. at 739 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent in Weeks, echoing
the dissent in Buchanan, suggested that lawyers might understand Instruction No. 2 better
than nonlawyers. See id. at 736 (Stevens,J, dissenting). Our data provide some support for
that hypothesis. When we conducted the experiment on second- and third-year Cornell
law students enrolled in a course on criminal procedure, students who received the instruc-
tions-and nothing more-misunderstood the law almost as much as did the mock jurors
who also received nothing more than the instructions. Forty-three percent of the students
misunderstood the relevant legal principle, compared to 44% of the mock jurors. How-
ever, when the students were told to reread the instruction, their level of misunderstanding
dropped dramatically-falling to 23%-whereas the level of misunderstanding among the
mock jurors actually increased-climbing to 49%.
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Supreme Court thought not. But the evidence, to which we now turn,
points to the opposite conclusion.
II
TESTING WEKS
Did the jury in Weeks understand the law or not? In order to an-
swer this question, the majority and the dissent in Weeks each looked
at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the jury's inquiry. But
they interpreted these circumstances very differently. The majority
concluded that, when all was said and done, only a "slight possibil-
ity"26 existed that the jury's members were confused; the dissent con-
cluded that confusion was a "virtual certainty. '27 Each side looked at
the same set of facts, but relying only on common sense and intuition,
drew from those facts contradictory conclusions.
We wanted more to go on than common sense and intuition:
Hence our experiment. Of course, no experiment can tell us what the
actual jurors in Weeks did or did not understand, but our results none-
theless provide an empirical basis upon which to assess the particular
facts of the case. We find that the Weeks dissenters were probably
right. Thejury that condemned Lonnie Weeks to death probably con-
tained several members who did not understand the law; it would
likely have contained fewer confused members if the trial judge had
given a simple and direct answer to the jury's question.
A. Designing the Test
We placed an ad in local newspapers in Williamsburg and New-
port News, Virginia. Respondents were death-qualified by tele-
phone.28 A total of 154 members of the two communities eventually
participated in mock sessions held on three separate days. Seventy-
26 Id at 734 (emphasis omitted).
27 Id at 735 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28 A state may exclude a veniremember from service on a capital case, if he or she
would be unable or unwilling to impose a death sentence under any circumstances. See
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968) ("[A] sentence of death cannot be car-
ried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen
for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed
conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction."). This process is called "death-
qualification." If a state chooses to exclude veniremembers on this basis, as Virginia does,
then it must likewise exclude jurors who would impose the death penalty in all capital
cases. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (holding that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entities a capital defendant to challenge for cause
any prospective juror who "will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case...
[and who wvill therefore] fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do"). This process is called
"life-qualification." In actual capital trials, death- and life-qualifications are accomplished
through voir dire.
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five percent of the participants were college students, 29 seventy per-
cent were between eighteen and twenty-one years old, seventy-three
percent were female, and seventy-four percent were white.
We designed our experiment to replicate as closely as possible the
facts in Weeks. 30 Alljurors were given a one-page summary of the facts
in Weeks, which researchers read aloud as the jurors followed along.
Researchers told the jurors to assume that Weeks had been convicted
of capital murder. The only remaining issue, which each juror was
told he or she would individually be asked to decide,31 was Weeks's
sentence: death or life imprisonment. Researchers then read aloud
the actual sentencing instructions used at trial, though-consistent
with Virginia practice-the jurors were not yet provided with a copy of
the instructions.
The jurors were next given a one and a half page statement re-
flecting a summary of the prosecutor's closing arguments in the pen-
alty phase of the case, as well as a one and a half page summary of
defense counsel's closing. Both statements, drawn from the actual
trial transcript, were read aloud to the jurors as they followed along.
The previously read jury instructions were then handed out, together
with the five separate verdict forms used in the case: (1) death based
on future dangerousness; (2) death based on heinousness; (3) death
based on heinousness and future dangerousness; (4) life imprison-
ment; and (5) life imprisonment plus a fine to be determined by the
jury. Researchers read aloud each of the verdict forms, with the jurors
again following along.
The jurors were sorted into three separate groups. One group
received the jury instructions, but was not told to assume that any-
thing out of the ordinary had happened during the course of the
jury's deliberations (no-question group). A second group received
the jury instructions, but was in addition told to assume that the jury
asked the judge a question about the instructions. The group's mem-
bers were then presented with and read the actual question asked in
Weeks, along with the judge's actual reply (actual-reply group). A third
group of jurors received the jury instructions and, like the second
group, was told to assume that the jury had asked the judge a question
29 Most of these participants, if not all, were enrolled in the College of William and
Mary or Christopher Newport University.
30 The documents used in connection with the experiment are reproduced infra Ap-
pendices I-VI.
31 We did not ask the jurors to deliberate. The effect of deliberation on how well
jurors understand instructions is less than clear. Compare Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve
Heads Better Than One?, LAw & CONTEMP. PROas., Autumn 1989, at 205, 218 (suggesting
based on intensive case studies of 18 mock juries that the "deliberation process works well
in correcting errors of fact but not in correcting errors of law"), with Lieberman & Sales,
supra note 6, at 596 ("[I]n many of the studies where judicial instructions are effective, the
mock jurors engaged in group deliberations." (citation omitted)).
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about the instructions. Like the second group, the third group was
presented with and read the question asked in Weeks, only this time
the jurors were presented with and read the following reply, which we
crafted from the actual defense request (requested-reply group):
Even if you find that the State has proved one or both of the
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, you may give effect
to the evidence in mitigation by sentencing the defendant to life in
prison.3 2
The jurors were asked to select a verdict, after which the verdict
forms and all other materials were collected. The jurors were then
asked two sets of questions. The first set collected basic demographic
data: sex, race, age, and religious affiliation. The second set asked
several questions designed to test how well the jurors understood a
few basic and well-established constitutional rules governing their de-
liberations,33 including the rule that a capital juror is never required to
impose a death sentence, no matter what facts she finds in
aggravation.
B. Analyzing the Results
Two of our comprehension questions focused directly on the is-
sue troubling the jury in Weeks. One question asked: "After hearing
the instructions, did you believe that the law required you to impose a
death sentence if the evidence proved that Mr. Weeks's conduct was
heinous, vile, or depraved?" The second question asked: "After hear-
ing the instructions, did you believe that the law required you to im-
pose a death sentence if the evidence proved that Mr. Weeks would be
dangerous in the future?" Ajuror who answered "yes" to either ques-
tion would, assuming she was true to her beliefs and followed the law
as she understood it, ignore a defendant's mitigating evidence once
she concluded that the evidence proved either heinousness or
dangerousness.
Table 1 presents the aggregate results. Altogether, fifty-nine per-
cent of the 154 jurors answered the first question "no," which is the
correct response. As a matter of law, capital jurors are never required
to impose a death sentence, no matter how heinous the crime or dan-
gerous the defendant.3 4 But forty-one percent gave the wrong answer:
32 See infra Appendix VI.
33 Each of these questions was taken verbatim from questions used in the Capital Jury
Project (CJP), thus facilitating comparisons between the results of our mock study and the
results already emerging from the nationwide efforts of the CJP. See infra note 37 and
accompanying text.
34 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[I]n
capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment
requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the cir-
cumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process
2000]
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TABLE 1
JUROR COMPREHENSION-MANDATORY SENTENCING
(% responding)
Yes No
After hearing the instructions, did you believe that the 41 59 100%
law required you to impose a death sentence if the (n=154)
evidence proved that Mr. Weeks's conduct was heinous,
vile, or depraved?
Yes No
After hearing the instructions, did you believe that the 38 62 100%
law required you to impose a death sentence if the (n=154)
evidence proved that Mr. Weeks would be dangerous in
the future?
"yes." Much the same goes for the second question. Sixty-two percent
of the jurors answered "no," which is again the correct response. But
that still leaves thirty-eight percent who answered the second question
incorrectly. Both results are troubling.
If, as the Court concluded in Buchanan, no reasonable juror
would have misunderstood Instruction No. 2, 35 then a disturbing
number of our jurors failed to act reasonably. Reasonable jurors, ac-
cording to the Buchanan Court, would not have thought Instruction
No. 2 required them to impose a death sentence, even if they found
that the defendant was death-eligible because the state had proven
either heinousness or dangerousness. But that's exactly what thirty-
eight to forty-one percent of our mock jurors did believe. Buchanan
would call these jurors unreasonable. The alternative conclusion, of
course, is that these jurors were simply confused.
One might argue that mock jurors, not being real jurors, pay
comparatively less attention to sentencing instructions. But data from
of inflicting the penalty of death." (citation omitted)); see also McKoy v. North Carolina,
494 U.S. 433, 444 (1990) (concluding that the state's "unanimity requirement impermissi-
bly limitied] jurors' consideration of mitigating evidence and hence is contrary to our
decision in Mills"); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988) ("Under our cases, the
sentencer must be permitted to consider all mitigating evidence."); Hitchcock v. Dugger,
481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987) (holding that sentencing judge's refusal "to consider[ ] evi-
dence of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances ... did not comport with the requirements
of Skipper v. South Carolina, Eddings v. Oklahoma, and Lockett v. Ohio" (citations omitted));
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) ("The sentencer may not refuse to consider
or be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence." (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982) ("Just as
the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor,
neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating
evidence."); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("[A]n individu-
alized decision is essential in capital cases.").
35 See Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 278-79 (1998).
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real capital jurors suggest otherwise. 36 The nationwide Capital Jury
Project (CJP) interviewed hundreds of jurors from several different
states, asking each juror a wide range of questions about the trial on
which they sat, including the same two questions we asked the jurors
in our study.3 7 The CJP results, based on a sample of some 650 jurors
from seven different states, are much the same as ours.38 Forty-one
percent of the CJP jurors erroneously believed that the law required
them to impose a death sentence if the evidence proved that the de-
fendant's crime was heinous, vile, or depraved,3 9 the same percentage
as our mock jurors. Likewise, thirty-two percent of the CJPjurors er-
roneously believed that the law required them to impose a death sen-
tence if the evidence proved that the defendant would be dangerous
in the future,40 a figure comparable to our thirty-eight percent.4'
36 Cf Lieberman & Sales, supra note 6, at 592 (citing 1992 study suggesting that the
"findings of empirical studies on comprehension are representative of actual juror
comprehension").
37 For a description of the CapitalJury Project, see WlliamJ. Bowers, The Capital Jury
Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. LJ. 1043 (1995).
Quantitative analyses of CP data to date can be found in William J. Bowers et al.,
Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing. Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and
Premature Decision Making, 83 CoRNELL L. REv. 1476 (1998) (multistate data); William J.
Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical Demonstration of False and
Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEx. L. RF-v. 605 (1998) (multistate data); Theodore
Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sony? The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 CoRNLL L.
REv. 1599 (1998) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sony?] (South Carolina data);
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing. An Empirical Study, 44
Burr. L. REv. 339 (1996) (South Carolina data); Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells,
Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CoRNELL L. REv. 1 (1993) (South
Carolina data); Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do
Jurors Think, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538 (1998) [hereinafter Garvey, Jurors] (South Carolina
data); Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming Apr. 2000) [hereinafter Garvey, Emotional Economy] (South Carolina data);
James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Mis-
guided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161 (1995) (North Carolina data); Marla Sandys, Cross-Overs-Capital
Jurors Who Change Their Minds About the Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines,
70 IND. L.J. 1183 (1995) (Kentucky data); Benjamin D. Steiner et al., Folk Knowledge as Legal
Action: Death Penalty Judgments and the Tenet of Early Release in a Culture of Mistrust and Puni-
tiveness, 33 L. & Soc', REv. 461 (1999) (multistate data); Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury
and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CoRNELL L.
REv. 1557 (1998) [hereinafter Sundby, Absolution] (California data); and Scott E. Sundby,
TheJuy as Critic: An Empirical Look at How CapitalJuries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83
VA. L. Rev. 1109 (1997) (California data).
Qualitative analyses of CJP data to date can be found in Joseph L. Hoffmann, Where's
the Buck?-Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. LJ.
1137 (1995) (Indiana data); Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in Capital
Trials: The Viewfrom the Jury, 70 IND. LJ. 1103 (1995) (Georgia data).
38 See Bowers, supra note 37, at 1091 tbl.7.
39 See id
40 See id.
41 The following Table compares responses from jurors in the nationwide CapitalJury
Project with those from jurors in our mock study:
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1. Does Clarification Improve Comprehension?
According to the Weeks majority, the chance that the jury might
have misunderstood Instruction No. 2 was remote. In all likelihood,
the Court concluded, the jurors fully understood what they were sup-
posed to do. Consequently, the Court had no occasion to ask what
difference, if any, it would have made if the trial judge had simply and
directly answered the jury's question. Nonetheless, our results suggest
a big difference.
Table 2 shows the responses of our first two groups ofjurors: the
no-question group, which received the pattern instructions alone and
the actual-reply group, which received the pattern instructions, the
jury's question, and the judge's response telling them to reread the
instruction. If we look at these two groups together-all the jurors
whose only guidance was the same as that which the actual Weeksjurors
received-nearly half of them (forty-seven percent) believed that Vir-
ginia law required them to impose a death sentence if the evidence
proved that Weeks's conduct was heinous, vile, or depraved. Nearly
half of the members of these same two groups (forty-six percent) like-
wise believed that the law required them to impose a death sentence if
the evidence proved that Weeks would be dangerous in the future.
Moreover, simply directing the jurors to reread the pattern in-
struction did nothing to improve their comprehension. Jurors who
heard the real jury's question and who were directed to look at the
original instruction were at least as likely to believe that they were re-
quired to impose a death sentence if they found an aggravating factor
Juror Comprehension-Mandatory Sentencing
Capital Jury Project Jurors v. Weeks Mock Jurors
(% responding)
After hearing the instructions, did you believe that the law required you to impose a death
sentence if the evidence proved that [the defendant's] conduct was heinous, vile, or
depraved?
Yes No
Capital Jury Project Jurors 41 58 99%
(n=655)
Weeks Mock Jurors 41 59 100%
(n=154)
Fisher's exact test p=0.928
After hearing the instructions, did you believe that the law required you to impose a death
sentence if the evidence proved that [the defendant] would be dangerous in the future?
Yes No
Capital Jury ProjectJurors 32 67 98%
(n=652)
Weeks MockJurors 38 62 100%
(n=53)
Fisher's exact test p=0.183
NoTE: Data for Capital Jury Project jurors were taken from William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury
Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. LJ. 1043, 1091 thl. 7 (1995).
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TABLE 2
JUROR COMPREHENSION-MANDATORY SENTENCING
No QUESTION V. ACTUAL REPLY
(% responding)
After hearing the instructions, did you believe that the law required you to
impose a death sentence if the evidence proved that Mr. Weeks's conduct was
heinous, vile, or depraved?
Yes No
No question 44 56 100%
(n=50)
Actual reply 49 51 100%
(n=53)
Fisher's exact test p=0.694
After hearing the instructions, did you believe that the law required you to
impose a death sentence if the evidence proved that Mr. Weeks would be
dangerous in the future?
Yes No
No question 46 54 100%
(n=50)
Actual reply 45 55 100%
(n=53)
Fisher's exact test p=1.000
as were jurors who heard the instruction only once. Indeed, simply
referring jurors back to the original instruction actually resulted in a
five percentage point increase in the number of jurors who thought
they were required to impose death if the evidence proved Weeks's
conduct was heinous, vile, or depraved, which was in fact the aggravat-
ing factor the real Weeks jury ended up returning.
In contrast, the requested reply to the jury's question in Weeks
dramatically increases comprehension. As Table 3 shows, among ju-
rors who were made aware of the jury's question and who received a
clarifying answer, only twenty-nine percent believed that the law re-
quired them to impose death if they found heinousness, compared to
forty-nine percent among those who were directed back to the origi-
nal instruction. The results for future dangerousness are similar.
Among jurors who received a clarifying instruction, only twenty-four
percent continued to believe that a death sentence was mandatory if
they found that the defendant would be dangerous in the future. In
other words, a clarifying instruction would have corrected the misun-
derstanding among forty percent of the otherwise confused jurors.
Moreover, these results are statistically significant under traditional
measures. Differences this extreme are very unlikely to be the result
of chance.
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TABLE 3
JUROR COMPREHENSION-MANDATORY SENTENCING
AcTuAL REPLY V. REQUESTED REPLY
(% responding)
After hearing the instructions, did you believe that the law required you to
impose a death sentence if the evidence proved that Mr. Weeks's conduct was
heinous, vile, or depraved?
Yes No
Actual reply 49 51 100%
(n=53)
Requested reply 29 71 100%
(n=51)
Fisher's exact test p=0.047
After hearing the instructions, did you believe that the law required you to
impose a death sentence if the evidence proved that Mr. Weeks would be
dangerous in the future?
Yes No
Actual reply 45 55 100%
(n=53)
Requested reply 24 76 100%
(n=51)
Fisher's exact test p-0.024
2. Does Improved Comprehension Influence Sentencing?
Does ajuror's belief that she must return a death sentence if she
finds heinousness have any influence on the sentence she imposes?
The answer will undoubtedly depend on the strength of the case at
hand. Where the evidence in favor of death is extremely weak or ex-
tremely strong, improved comprehension probably wouldn't change
the verdict of most jurors. In extremely weak cases, many jurors
wouldn't find an aggravating factor in the first place and thus would
never even reach the death-selection question; in extremely strong
cases, most jurors would probably vote for death whether or not they
believed that the law required them to do so.
In closer cases, understanding the instruction might well make all
the difference. Weeks is such a case. The victim was a state trooper,
which conventional wisdom and public opinion polls suggest would
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be highly aggravating.42 But Weeks was young;43 the killing itself was,
according to the defense, done on impulse;44 and Weeks expressed
remorse for his wrongdoing.45 Indeed, the very fact that the Weeks ju-
rors, many of whom wept as they announced their verdict, asked for
clarification suggests that some of them were prepared to change
their vote one way or the other, all depending on what the judge said
in reply. In all likelihood, the outcome for some jurors turned on
what they believed the law required of them. The facts alone were
indeterminate. Neither life nor death was the obvious choice.
Table 4 examines the relationship, based on the facts in Weeks,
between a juror's understanding of the relevant legal rule and the
sentence he voted to impose.
Jurors who understood the rule were in fact more likely to vote
for life compared to jurors who misunderstood the instruction.
Although our small sample size failed to yield statistically significant
results, improved understanding does nonetheless appear to influ-
42 Cf Samuel P. Gross, Update: American Public Opinion on the Death Penaltb-It's Getting
Personal, 83 CoRNELL L. REv. 1448, 1466 tbl.4 (1998) (indicating that 75% of public-opin-
ion poll respondents favored the death penalty for the "[m]urder of a police officer"). But
cf. DAVID C. BALDus r AL., EQUALJuSTiCE AND THE DFATH PENALTY. A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYsIs 319 thl.52 (1990) (finding based on multiple regression analysis of capital sen-
tencing in Georgia that the fact that the "[v]ictim was a police or corrections officer on
duty" produced a "[d]eath-[o]dds [m]ultiplier" of 1.7 whereas several other aggravating
circumstances, at least some of which are intuitively less aggravating, produced even higher
death-odds multipliers); Garvey, Jurors, supra note 37, at 1556 (concluding based on CJP
interviews with 153 South Carolina jurors that "[m]urders involving child victims are highly
aggravating, but otherwise jurors clalm that the victim's status and standing make little
difference" as to how they would vote (emphasis omitted)).
43 See Trial Record-Oct. 21, supra note 8, at 62 (testimony of Lonnie Weeks) (testi-
fying that he was age 21 at the time of trial); cf. Garvey, Jurors, supra note 37, at 1559 tbl.4,
1564 (reporting based on interviews with 153 CJP jurors from South Carolina that 42%
believed the fact that the "defendant was under 18 at the time of the crime" would make
them less likely to vote for death); id. at 1576 tbl.10 (reporting similar results based on
interviews with 1017 CJP jurors from 12 different states).
44 See Trial Record-Oct. 21, supra note 8, at 84-85 (testimony of Lonnie Weeks); cf.
Garvey, Jurors, supra note 37, at 1555 tbl.2 (reporting based on interviews with 153 CP
jurors from South Carolina that 55% believed the fact that a "killing was committed under
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance" would make them less likely to
vote for death); it. at 1575 tbl.10 (reporting similar results based on interviews with 1017
CJP jurors from 12 different states).
45 See Trial Record-Oct. 21, supra note 8, at 97-99 (testimony of Lonnie Weeks); cf.
Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sony?, supra note 37, at 1637 (concluding based on CJP study
of South Carolina jurors that "remorse makes a difference to the sentence a defendant
receives-provided jurors do not think the crime is too vicious"); Garvey, Jurors, supra note
37, at 1560 (concluding based on CJP interviews with 153 South Carolina jurors that
"[l]ack of remorse is highly aggravating" (emphasis omitted)); Sundby, Absolution, supra
note 37, at 1596 (concluding based on CJP study of California jurors that "[t]he more
evidence that the jury can find indicating the defendant's acceptance of responsibility for
the killing, the more likely the jury will return a life sentence").
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TABLE 4
COMPREHENSION-SENTENCING CORRELATIONS
(% responding)
Life Death
Understood death is not required even if heinousness 63 37 100%
is proven (n=91)
Believed death is required if heinousness is proven 52 48 100%
(n=63)
Fisher's exact test p=0.245
Understood death is not required even if future 62 38 100%
dangerousness is proven (n=95)
Believed death is required if future dangerousness is 53 47 100%
proven (n=59)
Fisher's exact test p=0.313
ence the sentencing verdict.4 6 Among jurors who understood that
death was not required even if heinousness was proven, sixty-three per-
cent voted for a life sentence, whereas the corresponding figure
dropped to fifty-two percent among those who believed that death was
required. The results were similar for future dangerousness. Of the
jurors who understood the rule, sixty-two percent voted for life; of the
jurors who did not understand the rule, only fifty-three percent voted
for life.
III
DECIDING WEEKS
The results of our study, read in light of the prevailing doctrine,
suggest that Weeks should have come out the other way.
A. What Do the Data Mean for Weeks?
Some capital sentencing jurors will be confused no matter how
they are instructed. Indeed, some of this confusion may not really be
confusion at all. It may instead simply reflect ajuror's own conviction
that any defendant who is "death eligible"-any defendant guilty of
46 For studies finding a correlation between sentencing outcome and improved com-
prehension based on instructions rewritten in accordance with research in linguistics and
jury decision making, see Shari Seidman Diamond &Judith N. Levi, ImprovingDecisions on
Death by Revising and TestingJury Instructions, 79JUDIcAruRE 224, 231 (1996) (finding based
on study of 170jury-eligible citizens thatjurors who received revised instructions "were less
likely to lean toward the death penalty than jurors who received the pattern instructions
(51 percent versus 66 percent)"), and Richard L. Wiener et al., Comprehensibility of Approved
Jury Instructions in Capital Murder Cases, 80J. APPLIED PSYCHOL 455, 463 (1995) (concluding
based on mock jury study of 173 jury- and death-eligible Missouri residents that "partici-
pants who were less confused about the jury instructions (i.e., those who scored higher on
the comprehension survey) were least likely to impose the death penalty on the
defendant").
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aggravated murder-should for that reason alone be sentenced to
death.
Not all error, however, is beyond repair. On the contrary, our
results suggest that a simple answer to the jury's question in Weeks
would have eliminated forty percent of the error. Moreover, a forty-
percent reduction in the error rate will often tip the balance, from a
jury in which the majority of members are confused to ajury in which
the majority are not. When the court leaves the question unanswered,
as it did in Weeks, one would expect on average that half of the jury
will wrongly believe that they are required to impose death if they find
the crime to be heinous, vile, or depraved. In contrast, when the
court gives a clarifying instruction, that number dwindles from
around six down to three or four.
Indeed, these average figures may well underestimate the number of
jurors on the actual jury in Weeks who misunderstood the law, and thus
the number of jurors who could have benefitted from a clarifying in-
struction. The fact that the Weeks jury asked the question at all sug-
gests that many of its members had collapsed the distinction between
death-eligibility and death-selection, wrongly thinking the law re-
quired that they condemn any death-eligible defendant, only because
he is death-eligible. Likewise, the fact that the Weeksjurors had raised
the question sua sponte-rather than having us raise it for them, as we
did for our mock jurors-suggests that the clarification would have
had more influence on the real Weeksjurors than on our mock jurors.
In short, the Weeks jury probably had more confused members than
the average jury would have had.
No one can say how many of the jurors who actually sat on the
Weeks jury would have voted differently if the judge had given a clarify-
ing instruction. Our analysis nonetheless suggests that a correct un-
derstanding of the law could very well have made the difference
between life and death. Again, we would predict an even greater ef-
fect where, as in Weeks, the jury's deliberations had come to focus on
the particular instruction to which the request for clarification was
specifically addressed. An instruction is most likely to prompt a re-
quest for clarification when the jury's verdict somehow turns upon it.
Consequently, if the Weeks jurors had understood that the law never
requires death, a unanimous verdict in death's favor would, we think,
have been unlikely.
B. The Web of Case Law
When a Virginia jury asks what Instruction No. 2 means, the best
way to ensure that its members understand the law is to give them a
clarifying instruction. According to our data, merely directing jurors
back to Instruction No. 2 does nothing to remedy the widespread mis-
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understanding that death must follow as a matter of law if the Com-
monwealth has proven one of the two statutory aggravating
circumstances. Thus, the better practice is not to tell the jurors to go
back and reread the instructions, but rather to answer the question,
unless doing so would introduce prejudice or distraction.
Of course, the Constitution rarely requires the better practice
simply because it is better. In this case, however, the jury's misunder-
standing went to a basic constitutional rule governing capital sentenc-
ing.47 If Virginia had wanted to enact a rule condemning all death-
eligible defendants, it could not constitutionally have done so. The
Eighth Amendment outlaws mandatory death penalties, because they
fail to allow for particularized consideration of the character and rec-
ord of each convicted defendant.48 Accordingly, when ajury mistak-
enly believes that it must in effect follow such a rule, Virginia should
not be allowed to capitalize on that mistake. Allowing it to do so is
little more than a roundabout way for the state to "treat[ ] all persons
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human
beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be sub-
jected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death."49
Virginia could not enact a rule condemning all death-eligible de-
fendants as a matter of law. Nor could it empanel a juror who be-
lieved all death-eligible defendants should be condemned and for
whom mitigating evidence would therefore be irrelevant. "Any juror
to whom mitigating factors are ... irrelevant," the Court held in Mor-
gan v. Illinois,50 "should be disqualified for cause."51 It makes no sense
to exclude a juror who says during voir dire that his own beliefs re-
quire him to condemn every death-eligible defendant, but then to
turn a blind eye to a juror who says he believes that the law requires
him to do the same thing. Indeed, the juror in Morgan came to court
already believing that all death-eligible defendants deserve death; the
jurors in Weeks did not. The Commonwealth's own sloppy instructions
encouraged that misapprehension, and the Commonwealth, once made
47 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion).
48 See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("The
mandatory death penalty statute in Woodson was held invalid because it permitted no con-
sideration of 'relevant facets of the character and record of the individual.'" (quoting
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion))).
49 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion).
50 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
51 Id. at 739. Morgan and the Woodson-Lockett line of cases point in the same direction,
not coincidentally. As the majority opinion in Morgan points out, Justice Scalia's dissenting
view "may best be explained by his rejection of the line of cases tracing from Woodson v.
North Carolina and Lockett v. Ohio, and developing the nature and role of mitigating evi-
dence in the trial of capital offenses, [as can be seen by examiningJustice Scalia's dissent-
ing opinions in favor of] a view long rejected by this Court." Morgan, 504 U.S. at 736
(citations omitted).
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aware of the effects of its negligence, did nothing to correct the prob-
lem. On the contrary, it exploited the jury's mistake. The state's con-
duct in Weeks was therefore more culpable, not less, than the state's
conduct in Morgan.
Moreover, requiring courts to give clarifying instructions in re-
sponse to requests for such clarification hardly requires the courts to
get routinely involved in the business of rewriting capital sentencing
instructions. The jurors in Weeks were confused about a critical rule
governing their deliberations. They asked a question. They hoped
the answer would clarify the rule. Their question alerted the trial
judge to the fact that they had not understood the instruction and at
the same time gave him an opportunity to remedy their confusion. It
would have taken the judge no longer to answer their question than it
took him to refer them back to the original instruction. Under these
limited circumstances, the risk that the jurors' misapprehension of
the law "infected [the defendant's] capital sentencing [was] unaccept-
able in light of the ease with which that risk could have been
minimized."52
Consider by way of analogy the Supreme Court's plurality opin-
ion in Simmons v. South Carolina.53 Relying on public opinion surveys
and CJP data showing that jurors dramatically underestimated the
length of time a defendant would serve in prison if sentenced to life
imprisonment instead of death,54 the Simmons plurality held that a
jury must be instructed on a defendant's statutory ineligibility for pa-
role, provided future dangerousness was an issue in the case.55 The Court
reasoned that the state violates due process when it "create[s] a false
dilemma by advancing generalized arguments regarding the defen-
dant's future dangerousness while, at the same time, preventing the
jury from learning that the defendant never will be released on pa-
role."56 In Simmons, the prosecutor's argument signaled and helped
create an unacceptable risk that the jury's decision making would be
distorted. In Weeks, the jury's question signaled-and the state's con-
fusing instruction helped create-the existence of a similar and simi-
larly unacceptable risk.
52 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 (1986) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted);
accord Morgan, 504 U.S. at 736.
53 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion).
54 See id. at 170 & n.9 (collecting public opinion and juror surveys).
55 See id. at 156 (holding "that where the defendant's future dangerousness is at issue,
and state law prohibits the defendant's release on parole, due process requires that the
sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible").
56 Id. at 171.
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Of course, some jurors will consider future dangerousness even if
the prosecutor doesn't argue it.57 Likewise, many jurors believe that
they are required to impose a death sentence even when they ask no
question.58 Nonetheless, when a specific and readily identifiable rea-
son exists to believe that a capital sentencing jury may have been mis-
led-whether, as in Simmons, by a prosecutor's argument that
promotes a false impression of the facts or, as in Weeks, by a question
from the jury which shows that its members have misinterpreted and
misunderstood the law-due process requires the state to fix the mis-
impression it has created, rather than exploit it.
Indeed, in at least one respect, the case for a narrowly tailored
rule in Weeks is even stronger than the case for such a rule in Simmons.
In Simmons, one must infer from the prosecutor's argument a likeli-
hood that the jury will focus on future dangerousness and that a mis-
taken belief about parole may influence the jury's decision; in Weeks,
no such inference is necessary, because the jury's question itself di-
rectly signals both the existence of a misunderstanding and the impor-
tance of the subject of that misunderstanding to its decision.
CONCLUSION
The jurors who sentenced Lonnie Weeks to death did not under-
stand the law. They asked the trial judge for help. Based on our
mock study, the answer he gave probably did precious little good.
Consequently, when the jurors voted to condemn Weeks, some of
them probably still didn't understand the law and continued to think
that they had to vote for death. Yet no capital juror is ever required to
vote for death. The Supreme Court upheld Weeks's death sentence
nonetheless. But the Court's judgment is ultimately based on nothing
more than instinct and conjecture. Sadly, the evidence presented
here leads to one conclusion: The Court got this one wrong, both on
the facts and on the law.
57 See Bowers & Steiner, supra note 37, at 671 (reporting that the data "show[ ] that
the greater tendency ofjurors who underestimate the alternative to vote for death is not
restricted to cases in which the defendant is alleged to be dangerous, nor indeed to de-
fendants they thought were proved to be dangerous or whose possible return to society
greatly concerned them").
58 Cf Bowers, supra note 37, at 1091 tbl.7 (indicating that 41% of 655 jurors from
seven different death-penalty states responded "yes" when asked: "After hearing the judge's
instructions, did you believe that the law required you to impose a death sentence if the
evidence proved that the [djefendant's [c]onduct [w]as [h]einous, [v~ile, or [d]epraved"
(emphasis omitted)).
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APPENDIX I
STATEMENT OF FACrs
The defendant, Lonnie Weeks, is 20 years old. Along with others,
Weeks burglarized a home in North Carolina while the owners were
not present. He found keys to a car, which he stole. Weeks then
bought a gun, which had been used in another murder that Weeks
had no involvement in. There was testimony that Weeks bought the
gun because he planned to kill a man with whom he had quarreled
about selling drugs, but Weeks himself said that he had not been in-
volved in selling drugs, and only bought the gun to defend himself.
About two weeks later, Weeks drove the car from the place where the
burglary had been committed to Washington D.C. There was testi-
mony from one of his friends that Weeks planned to sell or trade the
car for drugs, but Weeks said that he went to visit family members. No
drugs or large amounts of money were ever found in his possession.
On the way back from Washington, Weeks was a passenger in the
stolen car, which Weeks's uncle was driving. A Virginia state trooper,
Jose Cavazos, was parked in a marked police car, monitoring traffic by
radar, when he determined that the car Weeks was riding in was
speeding. The officer activated his emergency lights and chased the
vehicle, bringing it to a stop after a brief distance.
As Trooper Cavazos approached the car on the left side, he asked
the driver, Weeks's uncle, to step out of the car. After the driver got
out, Cavazos asked Weeks to step out of the car. As Weeks got out of
the car, he was carrying a gun, which he fired five or six times. Two of
the bullets hit Trooper Cavazos, who died within minutes.
Weeks and his uncle drove away from the scene and parked at a
nearby service station. They realized that the uncle's driver's license
was still at the scene of the crime, and Weeks returned on foot to
retrieve it. He ran part of the way, then walked down the ramp where
another state trooper was already investigating what had happened.
After pretending to help, Weeks got the driver's license and rejoined
his uncle.
The police found Weeks and his uncle in the parking lot of a
motel, and after a preliminary investigation of the scene, questioned
them both. Four hours later, the uncle told the police that Lonnie
Weeks had shot the Trooper. The police then arrested Weeks, who
later that day confessed that he had shot the Trooper. Weeks also
wrote a letter to a jail officer admitting the shooting and expressing
remorse over it.
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APPENDIX II
PROSECUTOR'S REASONS FOR IMPOSING A SENTENCE
OF DEATH
I don't ask for a death sentence lightly, but there are so many
victims in this case: Trooper Cavazos himself, his two children, all of
the police officers from whom you've heard who grieve him, as well as
the kids to whom Lonnie Weeks was selling drugs. Lonnie Weeks's
grandmother, who raised him in the church and raised him to do
right, is also a victim. Lonnie may have grown up poor, but he had
the guidance of his grandmother and a coach. He had talent as an
athlete too, but that's not what he chose. And he did have a choice-
his sister, who grew up in the same household, is not a criminal. He
was on probation, and the judicial system had given him a chance, but
that is not what he chose. He has always chosen to do what is good for
himself-and he doesn't care about anybody else.
They showed you pictures of Lonnie Weeks's children, but he is
not a family man. He fathered two children by two different women,
and abandoned them both, and he has provided almost no support
for his children. His character witnesses talked about what a good
person Mr. Weeks was, that he was not violent, but they were talking
about the person he used to be. In the year and a half since he gradu-
ated from high school, he has done just about every kind of crime you
can think of except rape. He has been a burglar and a drug dealer,
and he bought a gun from a murderer, planning to kill someone in a
drug turf war, somebody who had hit him in the head with a gun.
And now, instead of killing another drug dealer, he has murdered a
State Trooper.
He could have thrown the gun out the wind6w, but instead, he
shot Jose Cavazos, an older "Pop"-type Trooper, when all Trooper
Gavazos did was to politely ask him to get out of the car. He shot him
six times. One shot would have killed him. But six times-that was
not just fear; he was determined to kill him. And that was aggravated
battery. But if that were all he had done, I probably would not be
asking you to sentence him to death. But that isn't all. Then Lonnie
Weeks got up on the stand and lied about what happened. He is a
liar, and he is dangerous.
He lied about what he bought the gun for-you heard testimony
from his friend, his "business" associate, that Lonnie Weeks was going
to kill a man over a drug dispute. But Lonnie Weeks claims he wasn't
selling drugs and claims he was going to wait for the man he argued
with to shoot at him first. He claims he panicked, but he went back to
get the license, went back in cold blood. He wasn't so upset that he
ran all the way; no, he slowed down before the people at the scene
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could see him in order to not look suspicious-and then he lied about
having heard some shots. That was vile, horrible, and inhumane. No
doubt about it-everybody else is trying to save the Trooper, and he is
calculating how to sneak off with the evidence.
He lied when he was questioned, and he lied on the stand. He
said an evil spirit made him do it! But if there is an evil spirit, it is
Lonnie Weeks himself. He lies and he is selfish. He says he is sorry.
Yes, but when he told you that he would die himself if it would bring
Trooper Cavazos back to life he put a condition on it-he would die if
he knew he would go to heaven! That was selfish too; that's not real
remorse.
Mr. Weeks burglarized a house, stole a car, was dealing drugs,
bought a gun that killed a man in order to kill another man, killed a
State Trooper who meant him no harm-and now he lies about it all.
He is a selfish, dangerous liar, and I am asking you to impose the most
serious penalty possible. He should be sentenced to death.
Don't let Trooper Cavazos' death be in vain. He died working for
you. Show all the other troopers that you stand behind them, and let
some good come from this needless death. We ask you to impose the
most serious penalty that the law allows for this most serious of crimes.
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APPENDiX III
DENDANT's LAWYER'S REASONS FOR IMPOSING A SENTENCE
OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE
I'm asking you to give my client a sentence less than death. Lon-
nie Weeks has admitted that he did a terrible thing. The victims of
this crime have suffered, and there has been a lot of anger. I would
never say there hasn't been a lot of hurt and anger, and I would never
say that being poor justifies something like this. He has admitted do-
ing wrong, burglarizing a house and stealing a car and worst of all,
shooting this Trooper. He isn't lying; he is telling you the truth. And
he is not lying about dealing in crack cocaine; the only evidence that
he did is that of ajailbird who was willing to testify in order to make it
easier on himself. There is no physical evidence of drugs, and drugs
are not the reason Lonnie Weeks took the car-he took it to visit his
family, because he had missed the family reunion in Washington D.C.
That was a stupid reason, but it isn't the reason the state is trying to
make you believe.
And it is not true that he repeatedly and deliberately shot at
Trooper Cavazos. He told you what happened-Lonnie Weeks
doesn't even know how many rounds he fired. And they were fired so
fast that an eyewitness said he only heard two or three shots. And he
didn't hit the Trooper in the center. These facts all add up to a man
who panicked, not to an expert shot. And there is no evidence that he
shot Trooper Cavazos when he was on the ground, and no evidence
that the defendant bought the deadly bullets that were in the gun;
they came with the gun.
And the defendant didn't lie about going back to help the
Trooper-he said he did it for his uncle. He could just have said
"tough luck uncle, there isn't any evidence there against me." But he
knew he had gotten his uncle involved in something he wasn't respon-
sible for, so he went back.
He did lie when first arrested; and even when he confessed, he
lied about where he had gotten the gun. But that was because he
didn't want to get others in trouble for what he'd done. And he tried
to be truthful with you on the stand. He admitted killing Trooper
Cavazos; admitted breaking into the house; admitted stealing the car;
admitted his one prior criminal conviction for selling marijuana.
Mr. Weeks is not a very eloquent person. He doesn't speak very
well, and he can't explain why he did this. I knew the state would
bring up "The devil made me do it," but those were not Mr. Weeks's
words, those were the state attorney's words, which Mr. Weeks then
agreed to. It was the only way he could understand why he did this:
He got out of touch with God, and then he did these evil acts. You
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know he was a very religious person-his Sunday school teacher told
you how he would sometimes cry in church, he was so moved by Scrip-
ture. He went to church, but he grew up in a very bad area, with
drugs and shootings. And for eighteen years, he went to church, he
was a star athlete, a man with real basketball talent, and he had no
trouble with the law. He was an exception to the rule. And you heard
all of those witnesses testify that they never knew Lonnie to do a vio-
lent act, not even to get in a fight, and they were shocked by what has
happened.
But then he went away from church, away from school, and he
started hanging around with the wrong people. And he had been
abandoned by his mother, who is a drug addict. She doesn't even
care enough about him to see him now, knowing her son is on trial
for his life. And that had an impact on him too. And when he got out
of touch with the Lord, all of this happened.
There is no excuse for what Lonnie Weeks did. He is repentant,
and he admits that he has sinned, grievously sinned. He told you that
if he could die and bring Trooper Cavazos back again, he would do it.
He did put in a provision-that he would do it if he could go to
heaven. Now maybe it would have sounded better if he said "I would
die to bring him back even if I would go to hell," but he told you the
truth as he saw it. He is trying to find God again, and that is terribly
hard under the circumstances. I pray ladies and gentlemen of the
jury, that you will return a sentence of life.
2000]
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APPENDIX IV
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Instruction 1
You are the judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses and
the weight of the evidence. You may consider the appearance and
manner of the witnesses on the stand, their intelligence, their oppor-
tunity for knowing the truth and for having observed the things about
which they testified, their interest in the outcome of the case, their
bias, and, if any have been shown, their prior inconsistent statements,
or whether they have knowingly testified untruthfully as to any mate-
rial fact in the case.
You may not arbitrarily disregard believable testimony of a wit-
ness. However, after you have considered all the evidence in the case,
then you may accept or discard all or part of the testimony of a witness
as you think proper.
You are entitled to use your common sense in judging any testi-
mony. From these things and all the other circumstances of the case,
you may determine which witnesses are more believable and weigh
their testimony accordingly.
Instruction 2
You have convicted the defendant of an offense which may be
punished by death. You must decide whether the defendant shall be
sentenced to death or to imprisonment for life or to imprisonment
for life and a fine of a specific amount, but not more than
$100,000.00. Before the penalty can be fixed at death, the State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the following
alternatives:
1. That, after consideration of his history and background, there
is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society; or
2. That his conduct in committing the offense was outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved de-
pravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim beyond the
minimum necessary to accomplish the act of murder.
If you find from the evidence that the State has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt either of the two alternatives, and as to that alterna-
tive you are unanimous, then you may fix the punishment of the de-
fendant at death or if you believe from all the evidence that the death
penalty is notjustified, then you shall fix the punishment of the defen-
dant at life imprisonment or imprisonment for life and a fine of a
specific amount, but not more than $100,000.00.
[Vol. 85:627
2000] COPRECTING DEADLY CONFUSION
If the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least
one of the alternatives, then you shall fix the punishment of the de-
fendant at life imprisonment or imprisonment for life and a fine of a
specific amount, but not more than $100,000.00.
Instruction 3
"Aggravated battery" means a battery which, qualitatively and
quantitatively, is more culpable than the minimum necessary to ac-
complish an act of murder.
Instruction 4
Mitigation evidence is not evidence offered as an excuse for the
crime of which you have found the defendant guilty. Rather, it is any
evidence which in fairness may serve as a basis for a sentence less than
death. The law requires your consideration of more than the bare
facts of the crime.
Mitigating circumstances may include, but not be limited to, any
facts relating to the defendant's age, character, education, environ-
ment, life and background, or any aspect of the crime itself which
might be considered extenuating or tend to reduce his moral culpa-
bility or make him less deserving of the extreme punishment of death.
You must consider a mitigating circumstance if you find there is
evidence to support it. The weight which you accord a particular miti-
gating circumstance is a matter of your judgment.
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APPENDIX V
Verdict Forms
Verdict Form #1
We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant,
LONNIE WEEKS, JR., GUILTY of CAPITAL MURDER and having
unanimously found after consideration of his history and background,
that there is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of vio-
lence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society, and
having considered the evidence in mitigation of the offense, unani-
mously fix his punishment at death.
Verdict Form #2
We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant,
LONNIE WEEKS, JR., GUILTY of CAPITAL MURDER and having
unanimously found that his conduct in committing the offense is out-
rageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved
depravity of mind and/or aggravated battery and having considered
the evidence in mitigation of the offense, unanimously fix his punish-
ment at death.
Verdict Form #3
We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant,
LONNIE WEEKS, JR., GUILTY of CAPITAL MURDER and having
unanimously found after consideration of his history and background
that there is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of vio-
lence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society, and
having unanimously found that his conduct in committing the offense
is outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it in-
volved depravity of mind and/or aggravated battery and having con-
sidered the evidence in mitigation of the offense, unanimously fix his
punishment at death.
Verdict Form #4
We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant,
LONNIE WEEKS, JR., GUILTY of CAPITAL MURDER and having
considered all of the evidence in aggravation and mitigation of such
offense, fix his punishment at imprisonment for life.
Verdict Form #5
We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant,
LONNIE WEEKS, JR., GUILTY of CAPITAL MURDER and having
considered all of the evidence in aggravation and mitigation of such
offense, fix his punishment at imprisonment for life and a fine of$ _ _
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APPENDiX VI
WEESJURY QUESTION & COURT REPsIES
WEEKS Jury Question
If we believe that Lonnie Weeks, Jr. is guilty of at least 1 of the
alternatives, then is it our duty as a jury to issue the death penalty? or
must we decide (even though he is guilty of one (1) of the alternatives)
whether or not to issue the death penalty, or one of the life sentences?
What is the [R]ule? Please clarify.
Actual Reply
See second paragraph of Instruction #2 (Beginning with "If you
find from... etc.).
Requested Reply
Even if you find that the State has proved one or both of the
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, you may give effect to
the evidence in mitigation by sentencing the defendant to life in
prison.
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